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ABSTRACT 
 
Histories of southern German firms during the Second World War suggest that 
Switzerland provided many highly-skilled labourers for Germany’s war effort, but no study has 
to date quantified these contributions. This paper examines the labour exchanges between the 
two countries, focusing on individuals working within a free movement and trade area in the 
border region of Switzerland and Germany. A maximum of 1,800 Swiss workers is ascertained 
to have worked in the German part of this area, representing 7.5% of the total labour force, 
12% of the highly-skilled labour force and over 20% of the metal workers in the ten-kilometre 
German zone. Swiss contributions are somewhat offset by Germans working in the Swiss zone. 
Most importantly for Swiss neutrality, this paper suggests that, despite initially supportive 
increased labour transfers at the start of the war, the Swiss government sought from 1941 to 
prevent workers from transferring to Germany.  
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Introduction 
 
Before, during and after the Second World War, Switzerland and Germany maintained a 
free movement and trade zone known as the Klein Grenzgebiet [small border area], which 
allowed the free movement of goods, materials and labour within a twenty-km area straddling 
the Swiss-German border. This is the only example of labour exchange where individuals could 
live in a neutral country and voluntarily work in a belligerent throughout the war. Before the 
war, other countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, operated similar 
arrangements. These agreements terminated with the start of hostilities.1 
During the war, this zone operated under an agreement dated 9 March 1939, the 
Schweizerisch-deutsches Abkommen über den kleinen Grenzverkehr [the Swiss German 
Agreement on Small Border Traffic]. This agreement was ratified on 29 August 1939, a day after 
the Swiss army mobilized in preparation for war.2 Individuals living within a 10-km area on 
either side of the border could move freely within the overall zone for any reason, including 
labour; they could also transfer money and goods up to certain limits freely across the border.3 
Figure 1 shows the Klein Grenzgebiet area with the internal Swiss cantonal borders. This new 
agreement dramatically improved the potential for employment exchanges in the zone by 
increasing allowable cash remittances from 10 Reichsmarks (equivalent to 17.5 Swiss Francs) per 
month to 10 Reichsmarks per working day.4 This increased the workers’ ability to remit wages, 
but limited transfers to those who lived in the Klein Grenzgebiet zone. Swiss living outside the 
zone could no longer remit wages without government permission and are therefore beyond 
this study’s scope.5  
The Klein Grenzgebiet had many natural advantages during the Second World War for 
Germany’s strained labour and capital. Swiss-owned manufacturing plants had long been 
established in the German part of the zone. These facilities used fewer German resources than 
similar German facilities elsewhere.6 Germany did not have to house, clothe or feed this 
workforce, based in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Railways transported the workers on tracks 
powered by electricity from Swiss hydro-electric plants along the Rhein to such German cities as 
Waldshut, Singen and Konstanz.7 Switzerland also provided some raw materials for businesses in 
                                                 
1 Edward Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany (Princeton, 1967); National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA) RG242/T-77/243/901075-901076. 
2 Schweizerische Bundesarchiv, Bern, Switzerland (Bar) E1070/1000-34/123, agreement dated 9 March 
1939; BAr E1070/1000-34/123, parliamentary message dated 29 August 1939. 
3 BAr E2001D/1000-1152/38 memo dated 17 February 1940, pp.6-7.    
4 BAr E1070/1000-34/123, agreement; BAr E7160-01/1968-223/249, undated memo marked “Bericht 
über die Grenzverkehrsverhandlungen mit Deutschland vom 10. bis 13. August“ 
5 Archives of the Ministerio de Asunto Exteriores y de Cooperación [Spanish Foreign Ministry] (AMAEC) 
R2225/1, pamphlet “Der Einsatz ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland, Berlin 1942 [The Employment 
of Foreign Workers in Germany, Berlin 1942],” pp.98-102. 
6 See chapter entitled “Die Steigerung der Produktion in Deutschland und Italien [The Increase of 
Production in Germany and Italy]” in Geschichte der Aliminium-Industrie-Aktien-Gesellschaft Neuhausen 
1888-1938: Zweiter Band [History of the Aluminium Company, 1888-1938: Second Volume, 1921-1938] 
(Zürich, 1943), pp.139-152; Hans Ulrich Wipf, Georg Fischer AG, 1930-1945: Ein Schweizer 
Industrieunternehmen im Spannungsfeld Europas [Georg Fischer, 1930-1945: A Swiss Industrial Company 
in the European Conflict Zone] (Zürich, 2001), pp.181-434. 
7 Horaire Suisse 1943 [Swiss Rail Timetable] (Zürich, 1942) ; Jean-Daniel Kleisl, Electricité Suisse et 
Troisième Reich [Electricity in the Third Reich] (Zürich, 2001). 
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this area.8 These advantages persuaded Germany to seek increased production there and to 
recruit as many Swiss as possible. 
Existing figures for the number of Swiss workers in the Klein Grenzverkehr zone are at 
best vague. Memos from late 1941 to mid-1943 indicate that Germany tried to recruit 35,000 
transitory highly-skilled Swiss metal and building workers into this area; this correspondence 
implies a large number working there already.9 However, separate German border crossing 
statistics for January 1940 indicate, on average, only 2,552 daily border crossings, of which only 
1,285 emerge as Swiss.10 The Swiss Federal Office of Statistics figures show only 485 workers 
commuting to Germany in November 1939;11 however, this office names no source for these 
statistics or methods for compiling them.  
Studies of the Klein Grenzgebiet suggest the importance of these highly-skilled labourers 
and managers; however, none provide figures for the number of Swiss workers involved, their 
earnings or estimates of their economic contribution to the German war effort.  
Historians Christian Ruch, Myriam Rais-Liechti and Roland Peter, members of the 
Commission of Independent Experts (CIE) established to study Swiss neutrality in the Second 
World War, suggest relatively close links between Swiss businesses in the German part of the 
Klein Grenzgebiet and their parent companies in Switzerland.12 The CIE studies provide an April 
1943 figure of 26,876 non-German labourers in these Swiss firms in Southern Germany, in an 
employment total of 158,690; this includes workers both inside and outside the Klein 
Grenzverkehr.13 They worked for companies including the Swiss aluminium conglomerate, 
Aluminium Industrie AG (AIAG), the chemical company Lonza and food companies Maggi and 
Nestlé.14 The first two were especially important to the German war effort, producing about 7% 
of all German carbide and 15% of all German aluminium in this area.15 The Swiss parents of 
these subsidiary companies demonstrably maintained significant control over them, providing, 
inter alia, managerial expertise, machine tools, raw materials, capital for expansion and other 
necessities for their daily operation.16 In a discussion of factory workers from Eastern Europe, the 
authors imply a net Swiss labour contribution to the Klein Grenzverkehr, but they do not provide 
a full account of it.17 
This study finds at most 1,800 Swiss transitory labourers, a small fraction of the 26,876 
foreign workers indicated by the CIE study who worked in the Klein Grenzgebiet during the 
war, a disproportionate number were skilled. They represent 7.5% of the total labour force in 
                                                 
8 Roland Peter, Myriam Rais-Liechti, and Christian Ruch, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit [Business and Forced 
Labour] (Zürich, 2001). 
9 NARA RG242/T-77/243/986448-986453; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986769; NARA RG242/T-
77/243/986482; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986480-81; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986440-986458. 
10 NARA RG242/T-77/243/901075-901076. 
11 BAr E3320B/1000-773/22, Deutsch-schweizerischer Grenzverkehr seit Juli 1936 [German-Swiss Border 
Area since July 1936] and Österreich-schweizerischer Grenzverkehr seit Marz 1938 [Austrian-Swiss Border 
Area since March 1938] in “Deutsch-schweizerischer und Österreichisch-schweizerischer Grenzverkehr, 
November 1939 [German-Swiss and Austrian-Swiss Border Area, November 1939].”  
12 Cornelia Rauh, Schweizer Aluminium für Hitlers Krieg? [Swiss Aluminium for Hitler’s War?] (Munich, 
2009). 
13 Peter et al, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit, p. 221. 
14 Ibid, pp.123-200. 
15 Kleisl, op. cit., p.63 and p.101.  
16 Peter et al, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit, pp.79-211. 
17 Ibid, pp.216-233. 
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the German Klein Grenzgebiet, but less than 0.2% of the total labour force in the German Land 
of Baden.18 The counter-traffic of Germans working in Switzerland totalled no more than 1,400 
transitory workers, who were more likely than their Swiss counterparts to be both unskilled and 
female. As a result of the skill and gender disparity, the Swiss provided Germany with an 
economic contribution three times the counter flow. 
Finally, the Swiss sought to limit worker transfers, in particular after 1941. Swiss policies 
are very contradictory in this period. Although the government went to the trouble of ratifying a 
new treaty covering the Klein Grenzgebiet at the Federal level three days before the War started, 
local Swiss governments acted almost immediately to limit worker transfers;19 they progressively 
increased the costs of the permits needed to cross the border and limited customs transfers to 
those specifically allowed in the Treaty, preventing excess funds from leaving Germany.20 These 
restrictions limited the advantages of working in the Klein Grenzgebiet. Workers there 
relinquished their jobs faster than in the German workforce, after 1943 in particular.21 These 
changes to Swiss local government policies demonstrate that the Swiss did not ultimately favour 
providing Swiss labour to Germany. Thus, the 1939 Swiss-German Treaty actually served to 
strengthen Switzerland’s independent position by seeking to limit labour contributions, while 
appearing to benefit the Germans.  
 
 
Methodology 
In estimating the workers, only the voluntary “guest” labourers who were: 
1. Not permanent residents in their country of employment  
2. Citizens of their home country  
3. Able to remit their earnings to their home country 
are counted. The current system of identifying foreign workers on the basis of citizenship 
is irrelevant if they cannot leave the belligerent country with their earnings. For Germany and 
Switzerland, these exchanges were limited to those living and working within their respective 
areas of the Klein Grenzgebiet.22 Only permanent resident aliens who could return with their 
earnings are counted. (See Table 1) 
Undeniably, these limitations reduce the scope of this study. German statistics indicate 
approximately 16,000-18,000 Swiss citizens working in Germany during the Second World 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p.336. 
19 Archiv Kanton Basel-Stadt (StABS), PD-REG/8c/(1)/2-1:3, Protocol dated 16 October 1939; Archiv Kanton 
Zürich (StAZH) Z6.6098, letter dated 22 January 1940; Archiv Kanton Aargau (StAAG) BA.09.0692, letter 
dated 9 September 1939; StAZH Z6.6098, protocol dated 26 September 1939. 
20 StAZH BEZ/AND/134/2-3. 
21 Appendix A; Roland Peter, Rüstungspolitik in Baden. Kriegswirtschaft und Arbeitseinsatz in einer 
Grenzregion im Zweiten Weltkrieg [War Industry Politics in Baden: War Business and Labour in the Border 
Region during the Second World War] (Munich, 1995), p.336. 
22 See Figures 1 and 2; BAr E1070/1000-34/123, agreement dated 9 March 1939. 
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War;23 but, as this paper shows, fewer than 1,800 of these Swiss citizens were residents of 
Switzerland. Only the Swiss residents working in Germany were subject to Swiss border controls, 
Swiss laws and the limitations on transferring remittances. The remaining 14,000-16,000 Swiss 
citizens in Germany were permanent residents there and hence largely beyond Swiss jurisdiction. 
They could not remit funds from Germany unless parallel contra-funds were available.24  
For greatest accuracy, whenever possible this study uses figures from the lowest 
government level; this means using largely Swiss sources. In Germany, organizational 
responsibility for the Klein Grenzgebiet was highly centralized. Searches of both Federal and 
local German records have not yielded records which survived the war;25 in Switzerland, 
monitoring, shared between the Swiss Federal Government and the individual cantons 
bordering Germany, was highly decentralized. Decentralization created duplicate entities with 
overlapping responsibilities, many maintaining copies of cantonal records. Estimates are derived 
from these materials.  
As seen in Table 1, only a few records and statistics on Swiss transitory workers in 
Germany have survived. Canton Zürich maintained complete indices of the 3,612 Grenzkarte 
[border passes] issued from 1 January 1938 to 31 December 1946, along with relevant personal 
data. These records have been redacted and sorted to reveal 2,085 permits issued to unique 
individuals.26 The Arbeitsamt [Labour Bureau] in Canton Aargau counted migrant workers by 
skill-type and gender bi-yearly.27 The police in Canton Basel-Stadt maintained records on 
Grenzkarte holders during the early war period which included name, date of birth and 
occupation; genders can be reasonably assumed from the given names.28 Statistics for 
Graubünden provide a very small number of transitory workers of unknown skill and gender. A 
summary of these statistics is reported later.   
As unit level figures for Cantons Schaffhausen, Thurgau, St. Gallen and are not available, 
they must be obtained through a proportional comparison of Klein Grenzgebiet trade with 
Cantons Basel Stadt, Zürich and Aargau according to Swiss Federal statistics;29 in estimating, it 
must be assumed that workers in the former group remitted the same amount in cash and 
goods as in the latter. Total economic activity of Canton Schaffhausen is 20% of the customs 
district including Cantons Basel Stadt, Aargau and Zürich in November 1939 and 150% for 
Canton Thurgau. The homogeneity of the regions makes this reasonable.30 The information thus 
derived provides the total number of Swiss workers in Germany every quarter from November 
                                                 
23 Mark Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und 
Häftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939-1945 [Labour under the Swastika: Foreign 
Civilian Labour, POWs and Forced Labour in the German Reich and the Rest of Europe, 1939-1945] 
(Stuttgart, 2001) p.87 and p.222. NARA RG242/T-77/243/986879-986880; NARA/RG242/T-
77/243/985921-985922; Imperial War Museum Archive Duxford (IWM-D) FD847/46, graphic entitled 
“Der Arbeitseinsatz ziviler Ausländer nach der Staatsangehörigkeit [Civilian Foreign Worker Statistics by 
Citizenship]” in S-Buch, Arbeitseinsatz [S-Book, Worker Statistics].   
24 BAr E1070/1000-34/123, letter dated 8 February 1940.  
25 BA-MA; StdtAK; and StdtWST. 
26 StAZH BEZ/AND/134/2-3.  
27 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
28 StABS PD-REG/8c/(1)/2-1:3, lists of border permits attached to correspondence dated between 28 
February and 11 April 1940. 
29 BAr E2001D/1000-1552/38, letter dated 22 May 1940; BAr E6351F/1000-1044, letter dated 31 January 
1939; BAr E6351F/1000-1044/491, letter dated 24 February 1939. 
30 SJdS, 1945. 
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1939 to December 1945; for comparative purposes, these figures are extended backwards to 
June 1936 using available wage remittance statistics for the entire Klein Grenzgebiet.31  
The archival figures for German residents working in Switzerland are sparser than the 
converse totals. In Canton Basel Stadt, the police maintained registers of those who obtained 
permits; the Canton Aargau Arbeitsamt [Labour Bureau] also maintained bi-annual counts of 
German workers in Switzerland.32 The Swiss Federal Customs Office had figures for the number 
of German residents commuting to Cantons Zürich, Schaffhausen, Thurgau, St. Gallen and 
Graubünden for work in 1943.33 Applying the changes seen in Canton Aargau to the figures for 
the other cantons gives a complete count for German workers in Switzerland every quarter from 
November 1939 to June 1945.34 
Using the permit and border crossing figures for both groups of labourers allows 
additional statistics for each worker group to be calculated. Estimates are made of gender, skill 
levels and the earnings of each group each quarter throughout the war.  
Statistics generated by the Rüstungsinspection Oberrhein für Baden [the Production 
Inspectorate for Baden, in the Upper Rhein Area] are used to generate figures for the actual 
number of German workers and their occupations in the Klein Grenzgebiet. As no precise 
figures for the ten-kilometre zone are available, local districts [called kreis] in which the ten-
kilometre zone is situated (even partially) are used. As Table 2 shows, these districts include 
those with regional capitals in Lörrach, Säckingen, Waldshut, Donaueschingen and Konstanz. 
With available information, this yields 24,950 workers in the German part of the ten-kilometre 
zone.35 The estimated number of highly-skilled and metal workers in Baden is based on 1938 
skill allocation figures, as shown graphically by the Baden Statistischen Landesamt [Baden State 
Statistics Office].36 Estimates for the number of workers in highly-skilled and metal-working jobs 
are included in Table 2. The 1938 percentages of skilled labour are multiplied by the 1943 
worker figures, failing other statistics of the number of skilled workers. Although no 
compensation has been made, using 1938 skill figures introduces some downward bias, since 
the number of highly-skilled and metal workers should have increased during the war. 
All the sources, both Swiss and German, admit substantial shortcomings. Most notably, 
there are potential bias effects, for available government statistics for most cantons provide only 
sporadic data points throughout the period. The long-term projections for Swiss commuting to 
Germany rely solely upon statistics from Cantons Zürich and Aargau; and on Canton Aargau 
alone for Germans commuting to Switzerland. Using the figures from so few cantons to project 
overall trends lets in bias effects for specific cantons. Although no evidence suggests this, it 
could very well be Aargau that experienced inordinate increases or reductions in its numbers of 
wartime workers. Given the information available, this potential error cannot be eliminated. 
 
                                                 
31 BAr E3220B/1000-773/22, report dated January 1940, pp.15-16; SJdS, p.10. 
32 StABS PD-REG/8c/(1)/2-1:3, lists of border permits attached to correspondence dated between 28 
February and 11 April 1940; StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG 
BA.09.0693, reports. 
33 BAr E6351F/1000-1046/12, letter dated 30 October 1943; BAr E6351F/1000-1046/12, letter dated 30 
October 1943; BAr E6351F/1000-1046/12, letter dated 10 November 1943. 
34 BAr E3220B/1000-773/22, report dated January 1940, pp.15-16; SJdS, p.10. 
35 BA-MA RW20-5/51- 57. 
36 Peter, Rüstungspolitik, p.92. 
 
 
6 
 
Swiss Workers in Germany  
This section provides overall statistics for the Swiss residents working in the German Klein 
Grenzgebiet. It determines that there was a maximum of 1,800 Swiss workers in Germany, 
mostly highly-skilled males, transiting between Switzerland and Germany from June 1936 
through mid-1946, roughly 7.5% of the labour force in the Klein Grenzgebiet area. 37  The 
figures declined steeply during the war. 
Table 3 shows quarterly statistics for each canton, as well as the total number of Swiss 
workers commuting to the Baden Klein Grenzgebiet. Cantonal figures reported in bold are 
taken from archival sources; those in normal typeface are generated from estimates, in 
accordance with previously-mentioned practice. As Table 7.3 and Figure 7.2 indicate, the 
population of Swiss workers commuting to work in the German Klein Grenzgebiet declined 
from approximately 1,800 in December 1939 to about 560 by June 1945.38 
 
Breaking this decline into periods, from December 1939 to December 1941, the figures 
fell slowly, by about 15% of the workforce; however, as German efforts to mobilize labour and 
foreign labour recruitment increased in 1942, the number of Swiss workers in the Klein 
Grenzgebiet decreased more rapidly.39 From March to December 1942, just over one-third of 
this group stopped working in Germany. A slight increase of approximately 80 workers or about 
10% of the workforce followed from December 1942 to June 1943; however, between June 
1943 and June 1945, the number of these Swiss workers halved. The reasons for the rapid 
decline in June 1945 to the low point of 563 transitory workers - about 2.5% of the labour 
force in the ten-kilometre area - are discussed in the last section.  
Skills and gender figures vary between cantons, depending on the economic environment 
in the area immediately past the border. Among the known figures, the workers leaving Canton 
Aargau to work in Rheinfelden and Waldshut were mostly highly-skilled male metal-workers, 
with 88% estimated as skilled and 86% male in December 1939;40 however, those leaving 
Zürich were largely unskilled (32%) and agricultural workers (42%); they typically owned farms 
immediately across the border. 90% of the workers from Zürich were male.  
To provide a comprehensive skill and gender profile of all Swiss residents travelling to 
Germany beyond Cantons Aargau and Zürich requires certain assumptions about individual 
cantons for which no or limited data are available. Too little stand-alone information remains on 
the skill sets and gender distribution of workers in Cantons Basel-Stadt, Thurgau, Schaffhausen, 
St. Gallen and Graubünden for a complete wartime profile; however, the figures for these 
cantons can be estimated using known quantitative and qualitative data. Skills and gender 
figures are available for Canton Basel-Stadt for the two months ending April 1940. As the skills 
and gender concentrations in Cantons Aargau and Zürich do not vary widely, it is reasonable to 
assume that the skill and gender figures from Basel for workers in Canton Basel Stadt last 
throughout the war. High per capita monthly earnings figures in the Eidgenössische Statistische 
                                                 
37 Peter, Rüstungspolitik, p.92; BA-MA R20-5/51. 
38 See sources for Appendix A. 
39 Peter, Rüstungspolitik, p.336.  
40 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
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Amt reports on the Austrian-Swiss Klein Grenzverkehr [small border traffic] indicate that workers 
from St. Gallen and Graubünden consisted entirely of highly-skilled men.41 
Gender and skills data for Cantons Schaffhausen and Thurgau must be estimates. With 
the lack of quantitative information, a gender and skill profile for these cantons must be built 
from qualitative knowledge. From the prevalence of factories for war materiel and the German 
desire to recruit highly-skilled Swiss in the Schaffhausen-Singen area, it can reasonably be 
assumed that highly-skilled, male labourers formed the majority of those based in Canton 
Schaffhausen.42 Swiss commuting from Thurgau to Konstanz worked in highly-skilled jobs in a 
city with both industry and commerce. The closest comparable canton for both is Aargau, where 
highly-skilled workers commuted to German industrial plants across the Rhein. Thus, gender and 
skills distribution estimates from Canton Aargau can be used for Cantons Schaffhausen and 
Thurgau.43 The resulting estimates establish that most of the Swiss working in the German Klein 
Grenzgebiet were skilled.  
Despite the decline in the number of workers, the wartime skill profile of Swiss workers in 
the German Klein Grenzgebiet remains fairly constant. Where displacement occurred, in the 
early part of the war, Swiss agricultural labour in Germany was typically replaced by skilled and 
unskilled workers. As Figure 3 reveals, the overall percentage of skilled labourers, starting at 
70% in December 1939, reached a low of 58% in June 1943 and then returned to 74% by 
June 1945. Similar trends were noted in unskilled labour; at 15% in December 1939, unskilled 
labour reached 29% in June 1943 before returning to 21% of the total employed in December 
1945. Agricultural labour remained a stable proportion of the labour force varying from 14% to 
16% throughout the war. Using the December 1939 worker skill profile, 70% (1,260) of the 
Swiss workers in Germany were skilled, 270 were unskilled and 270 worked in agriculture. In 
the ten-kilometre zone, this labour would have represented about 12% of the skilled labour 
force.44 Further estimated statistics on the number of metal-workers from Cantons Zürich and 
Aargau indicate that Switzerland supplied approximately 20% of the 3,505 skilled metal-
workers in this part of Germany.45 
Using similar assumptions, it is possible to produce a gender distribution of the Swiss 
workforce in the German Klein Grenzgebiet. A disproportionate number of working men 
travelled across the border. As seen in Figure 4, for almost the whole wartime period men made 
up 79% or more of the Swiss labour force commuting to Germany; the low point for male 
labour was December 1942, part of a decline which started for unknown reasons in December 
1941. However, the number of men had increased to 86% of the workforce by March 1944 
and largely remained until the war ended.46   
The gender ratio suggests the Swiss Klein Grenzgebiet workers resembled the workers 
migrating to Germany from other countries. On average, there were seventeen men for every 
three women in the Swiss Klein Grenzgebiet group.47 Statistics for voluntary labour from all 
                                                 
41 BAr E3320B/1000-773/22, report dated January 1940. 
42 NARA/RG242/T-77/243/986448-986453.  
43 See summary figures in Appendix B. 
44 See Table 2.  
45 Ibid. 
46 See Appendix A. 
47 Ibid. 
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countries suggest that 84% were men and 16% women.48 Using the worker statistics, skill and 
gender profiles, moreover, the earnings of Swiss workers in Germany can be calculated. 
Quarterly earnings for Swiss residents working in the German Klein Grenzgebiet declined 
in tandem with the number of workers (see Figure 5). Some assumptions must be made to 
estimate earnings. Wage rates in wartime Germany are based on both skill level and gender; 
consequently its groups must be broken into gender-skill sub-groups, such as skilled males, 
skilled females, unskilled males, etc. The available statistics for the distribution of workers from 
Canton Aargau suggest that overall the female population comprised 10% skilled, 57% 
unskilled and 33% agricultural.49 The number of male workers in each skill subset results from 
subtracting its total of female workers from the total in this skill level. Each skill-gender variant is 
then multiplied by its relevant average German salary, as reported in Appendix A.50 These 
Reichsmark salaries are converted at the constant wartime rate of 1.75 Swiss Francs per 
Reichsmark.51 
Using these assumptions, gross total estimated earnings for Swiss residents in Germany 
from December 1939 to June 1945 is 26.9 million Swiss Francs or approximately 0.32% of Swiss 
1939 NNI.52 Total earnings declined consistently each quarter throughout the war, largely in 
tandem with the overall reduction in the number of workers. Average wages fluctuated 
between 912 and 1,051 Swiss Francs per worker quarter, due to changes in the composition of 
the workforce and small fluctuations in the German pay rates.53 These figures exceed the almost 
nil estimates from several authors and demonstrate that Switzerland’s contribution to the 
German war effort was important in a few specific areas of skilled labour. 
Although the ultimate number of these workers and their contribution to GDP was very 
small, their impact on German production for certain specialty items should not be discounted. 
As detailed in the CIE studies, Swiss labourers working in the German Klein Grenzgebiet 
factories produced critical items for Germany, including aluminium, condensers, guns, machine 
tools, fittings and other specialized hardware;54without these the German war-machine would 
have been considerably less effective. Of course, the number of Germans working in Switzerland 
correspondingly reduces the latter’s contributions. 
 
 
German Workers in Switzerland 
This section examines how many Germans were working in Switzerland, together with 
their skill and gender variants and earnings. It establishes that no more than 1,400 Germans 
ever worked in the Swiss Klein Grenzgebiet during the war and their numbers declined faster 
                                                 
48 NARA RG242/T-77/243/985921-985922. 
49 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
50 Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland, 1928-1944, (hereafter SHvD), pp.470-471. 
51 Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz , 1945, p.255. 
52 Martin Meier et al, Schweizerische Aussenwirtschaftspolitik, 1930-1948 [Swiss External Business Politics, 
1930-1948] (Zürich, 2002), p.409. 
53 See Appendix A; SHvD, pp.470-471. 
54 Peter et al, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit, p.123-200; Kleisl, Electricité, p.63 and p.101. Wipf, Georg 
Fischer, pp.275-276.   
 
 
9 
 
than their counterparts’. These German workers were substantially less skilled than the 
equivalent Swiss in Germany and contained higher proportions of women. Their profile accounts 
for the substantially lower earnings. 
War-time figures for Germans working in Switzerland derive from Swiss cantonal figures 
combined with a set of October 1943 reports from the Swiss Oberzolldirektion on German 
transitory workers in Switzerland. Statistics for Canton Aargau originate from the Aargau 
Arbeitsamt reports previously mentioned and cover the whole war.55 For other cantons it has 
been necessary to rely on 1943 Oberzolldirektion reports (covering 1942), which included 
information on the nationalities of the German residents working in Switzerland; for Cantons 
Basel Stadt, Zürich, Schaffhausen, Thurgau, St. Gallen and Graubünden, worker figures are 
projected from the 1942 Swiss Customs figures, based on  gains and losses in Canton Aargau.56 
The principal assumption here is the increases and decreases in worker totals are similar for all 
cantons.    
The war saw a sustained decline in the number of German-resident labourers working in 
Switzerland. As Figure 6 and Table 4 show, the population of Germans working in the Swiss 
Klein Grenzgebiet declined from approximately 1,384 to June 1944, reaching an intermediate 
low of 335; then they rose from 335 to 474 and declined again from about 335 in September 
1944 to 112 in June 1945. This represented a total decline of 91% over the war.57 Exceeding by 
nearly two-and-a-half times the wartime reduction in the number of Swiss workers commuting 
to Germany, it was probably affected by German conscription demands.58 The precise Swiss 
workforce within the ten-kilometre area cannot be estimated for comparative purposes; 
however, the total number of German labourers commuting to Switzerland in September 1939 
represents approximately 0.18% of the workforce within the relevant cantons.59  
Because of a lack of available information, the skills and gender metrics of the German 
residents working in Switzerland must be estimated. Skill figures from Canton Aargau and other 
qualitative information allow skill levels for other cantons to be assessed which take into account 
their geographical differences. For overall estimates for Germans working in the Swiss Klein 
Grenzgebiet, including earnings, see Appendix B. Considering the cantons overall, these figures 
indicate approximately 35% of skilled workers, 54% of unskilled and 11% working in 
agriculture; the war saw little fluctuation in the skill statistics.  
These statistics using available skills or gender information are based only on the Aargau 
Arbeitsamt reports. The German residents working in Canton Aargau were mostly unskilled. The 
weighted wartime average of skilled labour in Canton Aargau was close to 42%, with all but 
1% of the remainder consisting of unskilled labour;60 this leads to a 40% disparity given the 
80% skill level of the countervailing traffic.61 
                                                 
55 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
56 BAr E6351F/1000-1046/12, letters dated 30 October 1943; BAr E6351F/1000-1046/12, letter dated 10 
November 1943. 
57 See Table 4.  
58 BAr E3320B/1000-773/22, reports.  
59 As measured from September 1939 to December 1939; SJdS 1941, p.41. 
60 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
61 Appendix A. 
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For the other cantons, a skill-gap similar to the one in Aargau has to be assumed. The 
Basel region and Canton Schaffhausen were large cities which attracted more semi- and higher-
skilled German workers than did other areas in Switzerland; the number of skilled workers for 
these cantons is calculated on the basis of the highest skilled labour rates for Swiss travelling to 
work in German cities (88%), reduced by the difference in skill levels between the workers 
commuting to and from Canton Aargau.62 This yields approximately equal numbers of skilled 
and unskilled workers in these cantons.  
By contrast, the more rural geography of the Klein Grenzgebiet areas in the cantons of 
Zürich, Thurgau and St. Gallen results in a higher percentage of agricultural and unskilled 
workers there. For all three cantons, the German labourers working in the Klein Grenzgebiet 
zones is estimated to be 20% skilled, 40% unskilled and 40% agricultural, based on examples 
of labour transfers to an agricultural area, such as Swiss workers from Canton Zürich commuting 
to Baden; these transfers emerge as 29% skilled, 31% unskilled and 40% agricultural workers. 
To compensate for the skill differential between German and Swiss workers, the number of 
skilled workers is adjusted downward by slightly less than one-half; the remainder are assigned 
to unskilled labour. This results in an estimate for Germans commuting to the more rural 
cantons of approximately 20% skilled, 40% unskilled and 40% agricultural. Considered 
together, these cantonal figures yield a combined workforce of 35% skilled, 54% unskilled and 
11% agricultural workers in December 1939. 
Estimates for the gender distribution of the workers, lacking other qualitative or 
quantitative information, are based solely on the Canton Aargau example. The gender 
distribution of German residents working in Canton Aargau favoured women 57% to 43%, 
using a weighted average of the wartime quarterly figures.63 Despite the slightly above-average 
number of skilled (and therefore male) labourers, the gender figures for Canton Aargau are 
used as the wartime average. Any other method of estimating the gender figures could be very 
complex, due to the time-dependent changes resulting from increasing levels of German military 
conscription. Similarly for the countervailing traffic, amongst the female workers, 35% are 
estimated to be skilled and 65% unskilled/agricultural. These gender-skill statistics serve to 
estimate earnings. 
The total earnings of Germans working in the Swiss Klein Grenzgebiet were about one-
third of their Swiss counterparts in Germany. For comparison, salaries of equivalent average 
German workers are used.64 As reported in Appendix B, gross estimated earnings for German 
residents working in Switzerland from December 1939 to June 1945 amount to 8.1 million 
Swiss Francs. This represents a miniscule 0.10% of Swiss 1938 NNI.65 As this reveals, net 
quarterly earnings during the war declined steadily, with the number of workers. Average 
earnings for the period fluctuated between 569 and 640 Swiss Francs per worker-quarter; 
average wages reached a peak in March 1941 and declined thereafter.66 
The Swiss contribution to the German war effort was roughly three times the German 
contribution to Switzerland. The difference between the expected earnings of the transitory 
labour groups amounts to just under 16 million Swiss Francs in favour of Switzerland. This 
                                                 
62 StAAG BA.09.0596, reports; StAAG BA.09.0692, reports; StAAG BA.09.0693, reports. 
63 Ibid. 
64 SHvD, pp.470-471. 
65 Meier et al, op. cit., p.409. 
66 See Appendix B. 
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indicates that 0.22% of Swiss 1938 NNI went to the Germans as transitory labour.67 While this 
contribution is small, no such contribution was being made to the British or Allied war efforts.  
 
 
Swiss-German Labour Exchanges and Swiss Wartime Neutrality 
At first glance, the quick approval of the 1939 agreement in the days before war started 
suggests that the Swiss sought to actively provide Germany with labour during the war. 
However, the statistics showing the limits on the labour supply refute this idea. So do the 
actions of the local Swiss governments and Federal government departments. From the 
outbreak of war, Swiss officials sought through various technical procedures to reduce the 
number of Swiss workers commuting to Germany, including reduced duration and increased 
costs for border crossing permits and enforcing customs restrictions on cross-border monetary 
flows, in particular after early 1943. These actions reduced the financial inducements to work in 
Germany and accelerated the decline in numbers of Swiss transitory workers. This contradiction 
suggests that Switzerland was attempting to treat the belligerents more equally than the 1939 
agreement initially suggests. 
Trends for Swiss transitory labour behaved like those for German workers in Baden until 
1943. As Table 5 demonstrates, between January 1940 and 1943, the number of Swiss 
transitory workers in Germany and the total number of workers in Baden closely correlate; the 
number of Swiss workers in Baden declined 15% more slowly over this period than the total 
workforce in Baden (January 1941=100).68 Some of this difference can be explained by the 
shortage of skilled labour and the German desire to retain higher-skilled workers, including the 
Swiss.69 Thus, although Germany often sought to exploit the area, Swiss transitory workers 
ultimately left their posts about as often as their German counterparts until 1943.70 
The relative decline of Swiss workers from 1943-1945 accelerates in comparison to other 
labour groups in Baden.71 This relates directly to a second wave of changes in the rules for Swiss 
authority permits, which encouraged the Swiss to leave their jobs more readily than did their 
counterparts. Table 5 suggests a 29% decline in the number of Swiss transitory workers from 
1943 -1944, compared to an increase of 8% in the total number of workers in Baden. The 
decline in the number of Swiss working in the German Klein Grenzgebiet from 1943 onwards is 
related to informal Swiss policy changes, designed to reduce the incentives for working in 
Germany.  
The changes increased the transitory workers’ costs and thus lowered their net earnings. 
The 1939 agreement required identity/permit cards called Grenzkarte for all transitory visitors, 
but allowed each country to regulate these border permits as those chose.72 In November 1941, 
two-year Swiss permits dropped to three-months at most. After mid-1942, the local Swiss 
                                                 
67 Meier et al, op. cit., p.409. 
68 Table 5; Peter, Rüstungspolitik, p.336. 
69 Ibid. 
70 NARA RG242/T-77/243/986448-986453 
71 Peter, Rüstungspolitik, p.336. 
72 BAr E1070/1000-34/123 agreement dated 9 March 1939. 
 
 
12 
 
authorities charged two Swiss Francs for each permit.73 These changes increased the costs of the 
original permit by between 8 and 24 times, depending on its duration.  At worst, workers could 
then spend up to 20% of their earnings on permits, as compared to less than 1% before.74 
These increased costs should have discouraged transitory labour.  
The Swiss government started also to enforce its customs allowances strictly. Before the 
war, workers earning more than ten Reichsmarks (17.5 Swiss Francs) per week were able to 
supplement the transmission of their cash earnings with consumer goods. Duty-free goods 
included valuable items such as up to 125g of sugar, 49g of coffee, 49g of chocolate, 49g of 
cocoa powder and various meats.75 However, after 1941, increasing shortages in Germany 
forced all earnings to be remitted in cash. This prevented Swiss workers from remitting all their 
earnings, which would have exceeded the cash transfer limits.  
Unable to use costly consumer goods to transmit their earnings, workers earning more 
than 17.5 Swiss Francs per working day effectively forfeited some of their pay every week.76 An 
average week’s wages of approximately 75 Swiss Francs could have taken five working days to 
remit;77 skilled workers earning above the average (over 100 Swiss Francs a week for a male 
skilled worker) would have lost part. The Germans tried to increase these cash payment 
remittance limits, but the Swiss agreed to the changes only for pensioners and travellers, not 
labourers.78 The limitations on remittances and increased costs for Grenzkarte were clearly 
enough to slowly dissuade these Swiss workers from commuting to work as before.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Swiss-German exchanges of labour within the Klein Grenzgebiet ultimately benefited the 
Germans. This study demonstrates a small net outflow of highly-skilled labour from Switzerland 
to Germany during the Second World War. The Germans provided Switzerland with largely 
unskilled female labour while Germany gained a disproportionate number of skilled male 
workers. The net contribution of the worker exchanges over the entire period represents less 
than 0.28% of Swiss 1938 NNI, but its impact on German production for specific wartime 
specialty items cannot be discounted.79 Swiss transitory labour working in German war factories 
produced critical items: metals, machines and other specialized products. Swiss even-
handedness is marked by this one-sided contribution to the German war effort: although very 
small, the Swiss made the Germans a net contribution three times greater than they received, 
but no such contribution to the Allies. 
However, despite allowing Swiss citizens to contribute by working for the German war 
effort, the Swiss government did limit the size and scale of the contribution. Although the Swiss 
                                                 
73 StAZH BEZ/AND/134/2-3. 
74 See Appendix B. 
75 BAr E1070/1000-34/123, agreement dated 9 March 1939. 
76 Ibid; BAr E7160-01/1968-223/249, undated memo marked “Bericht über die 
Grenzverkehrsverhandlungen mit Deutschland vom 10. bis 13. August“ [Report on the Frontier Traffic 
Negotiations with Germany from 10 to 13 August]. 
77 Assumes average quarterly wage of approximately 900 Swiss Francs as suggested by Appendix B. 
78 NARA RG242/T-77/152/887810.  
79 Appendices A and B; Meier, op. cit., p.409. 
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Federal government authorized pro-German changes to the operation of the Klein Grenzgebiet 
zone only two days before the war began, Swiss local authorities sought to restrict worker 
movements. Rules and restrictions designed to limit worker transfers were enforced; permits 
became more expensive and worker transfers were restricted by the ability to remit earnings. 
Consequently, the economic inducement to work in Germany slowly dissipated for most Swiss 
during the war.  
The story of Swiss labour in Germany suggests the Swiss government wanted to maintain 
favourable relations with Germany by preserving existing interests, while also preventing 
Germany from gaining large numbers of Swiss workers. The seemingly confusing dual policy of 
agreeing to and ratifying the new Treaty governing the Klein Grenzgebiet while also increasing 
the costs for Swiss transitory workers in Germany allowed the Swiss government to fulfil these 
goals. Existing Swiss workers could maintain their employment and transmit their earnings to 
Switzerland in cash; however, over the long-term these and other workers would be more likely 
to take up work at home as comparative employment trends improved. Thus, the Swiss 
government maintained positive relations with Germany and the illusion that they could provide 
the thousands of workers needed for the German war effort, all the while restricting worker 
flows and maintaining their independence.  
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Figure 1: Swiss-German Klein Grenzgebiet, 1939, with internal Swiss 
borders 
 
 Source: Author 
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Figure 2: Swiss Transitory Labourers in Germany, December 1939 to 
June 1945 
 
 Sources: See Table 3 
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Figure 3: Swiss Residents Working in Germany, by Skill Type, 
December 1939 to December 1945
 
Sources: See Appendix A. 
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Figure 4: Gender Distribution of Swiss Residents Working in 
Germany, December 1939 to December 1945 
 
Sources: See Appendix A 
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Figure 5: Total Quarterly Earnings of Swiss Residents Working in 
Germany, December 1939 to August 1945 
 
 
Sources: See Appendix A; based on assumptions explained in the text. 
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Figure 6: German Transitory Labourers Working in Switzerland, 
December 1939 to June 1945 
 
 
Sources: see Table 4. 
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Table 1: Sources for Swiss Worker Figures, by Canton 
Canton 
Swiss Workers in 
Germany 
German Workers in 
Switzerland 
 
 
Basel Stadt (BS) 
 
 
Basel-Stadt Police through 
April 1940; then based on 
Aargau/Zürich trends 
Basel-Stadt Police through 
April 1940; then based on 
Aargau trends 
 
 
Aargau (AG) 
 
 
Bi-annual foreign labour 
surveys 
Bi-annual foreign labour 
surveys 
Zürich (ZH) 
 
Grenzkarte log books, 
maintained by Police 
 1943 Swiss Federal Report; 
Aargau trends used for 
1939-1943 and 1943-1946 
 
Schaffhausen (SH) 
Thurgau (TH) 
St.Gallen/Graubünden 
(SG/GR) 
Based on relative Federal 
Trade Statistics, November 
1939  with 1940-1946 
trends estimated from 
Aargau and Zürich 
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Table 2: Labour Force in Baden Klein Grenzgebiet 
Kreis District 
Number Capital 
Number 
of 
Workers 
Est. High 
Skilled 
Est. Metal 
Workers 
Baden-11 Lörrach 2,784 720 270 
Baden-8 Säckingen 2,754 825 550 
Baden-3 Waldshut 1,771 890 355 
Baden-27 Donaueschingen 4,134 2,730 1,030 
Baden-18 Konstanz 13,507 6,100 1,300 
Total  24,950 11,625 3,505 
Sources: Bundesarhiv-Militar Archiv, Friburg (BA-MA), RW 20-5/51-57; Peter, Rüstungspolitik in 
Baden, p.92. 
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Table 3: Swiss Transitory Labour in Germany by Original Canton 
Overall Statistics by Quarter 
Date 
Total 
Workers 
Switzerland 
to Germany 
Basel-
Stadt Aargau Zürich 
Schaff-
hausen Thurgau 
St.Gallen 
and 
Graubünden 
  
      
  
Dec-39 1,759 326 130 190 130 972 11 
Mar-40 1,767 308 127 201 132 988 11 
Jun-40 1,737 303 124 199 130 971 11 
Sep-40 1,692 295 120 194 126 946 11 
Dec-40 1,657 289 117 191 124 926 10 
Mar-41 1,630 284 119 183 122 912 10 
Jun-41 1,579 276 120 170 118 885 10 
Sep-41 1,458 255 122 142 110 819 9 
Dec-41 1,492 262 131 137 112 840 10 
Mar-42 1,358 239 122 121 102 766 9 
Jun-42 1,140 201 113 87 86 645 7 
Sep-42 1,004 177 102 74 76 569 6 
Dec-42 920 162 90 72 70 521 6 
Mar-43 954 168 92 77 72 539 6 
Jun-43 1,001 176 93 85 76 565 6 
Sep-43 925 163 90 73 70 523 6 
Dec-43 783 139 87 47 60 445 5 
Mar-44 764 136 86 45 58 435 5 
Jun-44 716 127 84 37 55 409 5 
Sep-44 723 128 74 52 55 410 5 
Dec-44 658 116 64 52 50 372 4 
Mar-45 616 108 52 60 46 346 4 
Jun-45 563 98 39 66 42 315 4 
Sep-45 1,418 244 58 221 105 782 9 
Dec-45 1,451 251 77 202 108 805 9 
 
Sources: See text (previous discussion of archival sources.)  
 
  
 
 
25 
 
Table 4: Germans Working in Switzerland, by Canton, December 
1939 to December 1945 
Date 
Total 
Workers: 
Germans in 
Switzerland 
Basel-
Stadt Aargau  Zürich 
Schaff-
hausen Thurgau 
Cantons 
St.Gallen and 
Graubuenden 
  
      
  
Dec-39 1,384 938 46 108 12 97 183 
Mar-40 1,225 831 41 96 10 86 161 
Jun-40 1,065 724 36 83 9 75 139 
Sep-40 919 617 30 71 8 64 129 
Dec-40 772 510 25 59 6 53 119 
Mar-41 736 490 24 56 6 50 110 
Jun-41 702 469 23 54 6 48 101 
Sep-41 667 449 22 52 6 46 93 
Dec-41 581 388 19 45 5 40 85 
Mar-42 583 408 20 47 5 42 61 
Jun-42 558 408 20 47 5 42 36 
Sep-42 572 418 21 48 5 43 37 
Dec-42 586 428 21 49 5 44 38 
Mar-43 530 388 19 45 5 40 34 
Jun-43 474 347 17 40 4 36 31 
Sep-43 405 296 15 34 4 30 26 
Dec-43 419 306 15 35 4 32 27 
Mar-44 335 245 12 28 3 25 22 
Jun-44 474 347 17 40 4 36 31 
Sep-44 335 245 12 28 3 25 22 
Dec-44 335 245 12 28 3 25 22 
Mar-45 223 163 8 19 2 17 14 
Jun-45 112 82 4 9 1 8 7 
Sep-45 181 133 7 15 2 14 12 
Dec-45 251 184 9 21 2 19 16 
 
Sources: see text (previous discussion of archival sources.)  
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Table 5: Index of Comparative Labour Trends in Baden (January 
1941=100) 
January  
of Year 
Swiss 
Workers 
in Baden 
Total 
Workers 
in Baden 
Total 
German 
Workers 
in Baden 
Foreign 
Workers 
in Baden 
Georg 
Fischer 
Workers in 
Singen 
Plant 
1940 109    102 
1941 100 100 100 100 100 
1942 72 80 78 164 80 
1943 63 58 53 292 67 
1944 45 63 56 361 61 
 
Sources: Peter, Rüstungspolitik in Baden, p.336; Wipf, Georg Fischer, p.330; Appendix 
A. 
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